Egocentric and object-based transformations in the laterality judgement of human and animal faces and of non-corporeal objects by Ionta, Silvio et al.
RE
h
S
a
b
a
A
R
R
A
A
K
M
M
P
M
F
B
1
r
o
a
T
i
d
T
w
t
e
l
d
s
I
s
S
f
s
D
0
dBehavioural Brain Research 207 (2010) 452–457
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Behavioural Brain Research
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /bbr
esearch report
gocentric and object-based transformations in the laterality judgement of
uman and animal faces and of non-corporeal objects
ilvio Iontaa,b,∗, Alissa D. Fourkasa,1, Salvatore M. Aglioti a,b,∗∗
Department of Psychology, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, via dei Marsi 78, 00185 Roma, Italy
IRCCS “Fondazione Santa Lucia”, via Ardeatina 306, 00179 Rome, Italy
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:
eceived 19 August 2009
eceived in revised form 21 October 2009
ccepted 26 October 2009
vailable online 4 November 2009
a b s t r a c t
Mental rotation of body parts is inﬂuenced by speciﬁc sensory-motor information, andmay be performed
using an egocentric (subject-based) or an object-based mental transformation. Neurologically healthy
volunteerswere asked to verbally judge the laterality of visually presentedhuman face, owl face and front
of a car with a black patch over one eye/headlight, presented in one of eight orientations. Subjects may
or may not have their head held in a head brace. The transformation used to solve the task was assessedeywords:
ental rotation
ental imagery
ostural constraints
ental spatial transformations
ace inversion effect
with a questionnaire. Response times were non-monotonical at 180◦ for the object-based group, but not
for the group using egocentric transformation. Having head movement constrained by the use of a head
brace (“ﬁxed”) or not (“moving”) did not inﬂuence performance. Within the two groups, no differences
were found between the three types of stimuli. Hence, the response proﬁle for mental rotation of human
faces and face-like stimuli depended on the type of mental spatial transformation used to solve the task,
independently from the possibility to move the head and from the kind of stimuli processed.ody representation
. Introduction
Mental imagery can be deﬁned as the activation of an inner rep-
esentation that causesanalmost-perceptiveexperience inabsence
f an appropriate sensorial stimulation. It is used to transform
nd manipulate mental images and to mentally simulate actions.
he simulation of a movement requires an amount of time that
s proportional to the time needed to actually perform it [32,41],
etermines a speciﬁc facilitation on motor potential evoked by
MS [16] and activates a neural network partially overlapping
ith that involved in the movement planning [13] and execu-
ion [23,32]. Moreover, neurovegetative activation during physical
ffort is proportional to that measured during the mental simu-
ation of the same task [12] and different cerebral lesions may
etermine selective anddissociable imagery deﬁcits [41]. Given the
tability of temporal and kinematic characteristics of real and sim-
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ulated movements, it is reasonable that the same properties guide
both execution and simulation of the same movement [1,13,31]. In
this way mental rotation (a class of mental imagery tasks) can be
considered a good tool to study motor representations.
The effect of postural signals can produce an effect very speciﬁc
to the mentally manipulated body part [11,26,40]. For example,
if people are requested to judge the laterality of hands and feet
pictures, while varying the posture of their own hands but not
of their feet, then response time varies for hands’ judgement but
not for feet [25]. Moreover, mental rotation of body parts seems
to be inﬂuenced by both central and peripheral factors. Indeed it
can be impaired by transcranial magnetic stimulation applied over
the primary motor cortex of healthy subjects [21], by cortical [43]
and subcortical [24] lesions, as well as in patients with upper limb
amputation [29], locked-in syndrome [6], chronic upper limb pain
[37] and Parkinson’s disease [15]. In addition, patients with idio-
pathic cervical dystonia showan impairment in themental rotation
of body parts but not for non-body parts, such as cars [18], suggest-
ing the dissociation between the mental manipulation of body and
non-body parts [6].
The present study tests the effect of constraining head move-
ment during mental rotation. This behaviour is often observed in
participants taking part in experiments and the potentially speciﬁc
effect of such a behaviour on different classes of stimuli (human,
animal, and inanimate). In the present study participants were
asked to judge the laterality of different types of stimuli (human
face, front of a car, and owl face) in two different conditions:
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wig. 1. Stimuli. Schematic representation of all experimental stimuli (human, car, a
wo lateralities (R = right and L= left).
olding, or not, the head in a head brace. After each session,
hey were also asked to complete a questionnaire on the kind of
ental transformation they used to perform the task. If after the
doption of one kind of mental transformation, objects are treated
n the same way regardless to their nature, there should be no
ifferences in response times or accuracy between the different
timuli.
. Materials and methods
.1. Participants
Twenty-two participants (seven females) aged 19–33 (M=25.8 years, SD=3.2)
nd all with a college undergraduate level of education, took a part in the exper-
ment. All were right-handed according to an handedness inventory [2]. Ethical
pproval was obtained by the local ethical committee and written informed con-
ent obtained prior to participation. The study was carried out in accordance with
he ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
.2. Stimuli
The stimuli, illustrated in Fig. 1, were pictures of a human face, an owl face and
he front of a car, oriented at the upright and in one of seven clockwise orientations
rom the upright (0◦ , 45◦ , 90◦ , 135◦ , 180◦ , 225◦ , 270◦ , and 315◦) presented one at a
ime in the centre of a computer monitor. The upright view was deﬁned as nose line
ointing upwards at 0◦ of rotation. A black patch was applied over one eye (or one
eadlight) of each stimulus. The stimuli covered a visual angle of 11.4◦ viewed from
distance of 60 cm..3. Procedure
The experimental session consisted of six randomly presented blocks. Two
locks contained 96 face pictures, two contained 96 owl pictures and two contained
6 car pictures. Each orientation was randomly depicted 12 times in each block,
ith the same orientation presented no more than twice in sequence. The twod) in eight different orientation (0◦ , 45◦ , 90◦ , 135◦ , 180◦ , 225◦ , 270◦ , and 315◦) and
blocks within each stimulus type varied in terms of head constraint conditions.
As depicted in Fig. 2, in one condition the participants’ head was constrained by
use of a head brace (ﬁxed) and in the other condition the head was free to move
(moving). The order of head constraint and stimuli typewas counterbalanced across
subjects.
Participants sat on a chair in front of a computer with the monitor (Apple
ColorSync) positioned at 60 cm from the participants’ eyes. Stimulus presentation
was controlled with E-Prime, Beta5 (PST company). Each trial began with a ﬁxation
cross on the monitor followed by a stimulus 1000ms later. Each stimulus remained
visible on the screen until the response was given. Participants verbally judged,
as quickly and accurately as possible, the laterality of the patch (left or right) on
each stimulus. Written instructions were provided for each condition, for example:
“In a few moments, photographs will be presented depicting a face with one eye
covered with a black patch. The face will be rotated in different orientations on
different trials. Your task is to verbally report which eye of the photographed face
is covered by the patch (its left or its right) as quickly and accurately as possible.
Please maintain a stable and ﬁxed body posture, with your eyes on the ﬁxation
point (+)”. Response time was automatically recorded by a microphone positioned
25 cm in front of the participant and connected to the computer. Response accuracy
was manually entered into the computer by the experimenter and stored for
off-line analysis. A semi-structured questionnaire, reproduced in Supplementary
materials, was administered after each block to assess the cognitive strategy used
to accomplish the task (i.e., imagery strategy).
2.4. Data handling of questionnaire
Nine participants [aged 19–31 (M=25.5 years, SD=4; four females)] described
mentally rotating all the stimuli until they were in an easier orientation to judge
(object-based transformation). Nine other participants [aged 23–33 (M=25.2 years,
SD=3; three females)] described spontaneous spatial transformations of their own
body (egocentric transformation) from a position in front of the stimulus. Four sub-
jectsusedamixedstrategy.Given the starkpreference forone typeof transformation
in the majority of the participants we included the factor ‘Transformation’ in the
analysis; this decision resulted in the exclusion of the four participants who ﬂipped
back and forth between transformations.
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sig. 2. Head constraint. In the ‘moving’ condition subjects were free to move their
ead was held in a head brace (panel b).
Qualitative responses to questions from the 18 subjects retained are sum-
arized in Table 1 (supplementary materials), where the median responses are
dentiﬁed. Responses were converted from qualitative feedback (e.g. ‘always true’)
o a 7-point numerical scale in order to perform non-parametric analyses; there
ere a large number of tied ranks in the data. Friedman Analysis of Variance was
pplied to within group data to assess whether subjects treated the stimuli differ-
ntly depending on stimulus type and head constraint.
.5. Data handling
Endpoint measures (response time and accuracy) were deﬁned as in Ionta et al.
25]. Therefore response times <500 or >3500ms were excluded from analysis, and
ccuracy reﬂects correct responses. Although incorrect responses were excluded
rom the analysis of response time, the number of trials lostwereminimal as perfor-
ance approached ceiling. Trials excluded because they were too slow or incorrect
mounted to 5.6% of the total.
Response time and accuracy were each analyzed with mixed model analy-
is of variance (ANOVA). The two analyses included transformation (egocentric,
bject-based), head constraint (ﬁxed,moving), stimulus type (human, car, and owl),
timulus laterality (left and right), and stimulus orientation (0◦ , 45◦ , 90◦ , 135◦ , 180◦ ,
25◦ , 270◦ , and315◦) asmain factors,with repeatedmeasures fromthe second to the
fth factor. Post hoc analyseswere carried out using simplemain effects (Bonferroni
orrected) and theNewman–Keuls test (p<0.05). The distributions tended to violate
phericity, and therefore epsilon corrections are reported as Greenhouse–Geisser
ê) if the Huyht–Feldt epsilon (e˜) was less than 0.75. The measure of the strength of
ssociation for main effects and interactions is reported as partial eta squared (p2),
he proportion of variance in the dependent variable attributable to the effect. Eta
quared (2), which is dependent on the number and magnitude of other effects, is
eported only for simple main effects.
. Results
.1. Questionnaires
Responses by subjects using an object-based strategy revealed
o statistical difference across blocks for any question (all exact
≥0.133). Subjects using a egocentric strategy indicated a statisti-
al difference for question (b) “in the judgement of ‘right’ and ‘left’,
our response was based on the position of the patch with refer-
nce to yourself” 2(5) =15.28 exact p=0.003 although post hoc
nalysis with Wilcoxon Signed Ranks found no difference between
he highest (auto moving, 4.44) and lowest (face moving, 2.50)
ean ranks (p=0.156). The responses also indicated a difference
or question (g) “how often did you move your hand” 2(5) =11.23,
= 0.036; post hoc analysis foundno signiﬁcant difference between
he highest (owl ﬁxed, 4.28) and lowest (auto ﬁxed, 2.44) mean
anks (p=0.063). All other questions failed to reach signiﬁcance
all p≥0.067). These data indicate that subject’s cognitive strategy
as stable across blocks.
Notably when egocentric imagers had to judge 0◦ tilted stimuli,
hey performed an imagery rotation of their own body around the
timulus, insofar that they described themental activity as a kind ofpanel a) while in the ‘ﬁxed’ condition subjects had to perform the task while their
“dressing the mask” of the actual stimulus that is a rotation around
the z-axis in the ground plane [5]. Indeed, based on responses to
the questionnaires the differences found between the two groups
(described below) were due to the fact that, in contrast with the
object-based transformation, the egocentric transformationdidnot
involve mental rotation, regardless to the presented stimulus.
3.2. Response time
Response time data broken down by factor are presented in
Table 2 (supplementary materials). The ANOVA showed a signif-
icant main effect of stimulus orientation [F(7,112) =18.33 p<0.000
with ê=0.35, p2 =0.53] and stimulus laterality [F(1,16) =6.63,
p=0.020, p2 =0.29], both of which were superseded by signiﬁcant
interactions. Themain effect of head constraint did not reach signif-
icance [F(1,16) =0.39, p=0.54]. Stimulus orientation was described
by a quadratic function [F(1,16) =19.63, p<0.000, p2 =0.55]. Anal-
ysis of the main effect found that response time at 180◦ (1385ms)
was slower than at all other orientations. Response time at 135◦
(1169ms) was different from all the others except 225◦ (1170ms);
225◦ was different from 0◦ (1085ms), 90◦ (1064ms) and 270◦
(1069ms). The main effect of stimulus laterality was accounted
for by slower responses to left (1149ms) with respect to right
(1103ms) stimuli.
Transformation interacted with stimulus orientation
[F(7,112) =8.87, p<0.000, p2 =0.36], as illustrated in Fig. 3
(left panel). The simple main effect of the object-based transfor-
mation [F(7,56) =18.47, p<0.000 with ê=0.24, 2 =0.70] was the
only component of the interaction to be signiﬁcant with Bonfer-
roni correction (0.05/10=0.005). The simple main effect of the
egocentric transformation failed to reach corrected signiﬁcance
[p=0.017 with ê=0.27]. To simplify interpretation and facilitate
comparison to previous research, we calculated the linear function
from 0◦ to 180◦ with data equidistant from 180◦ collapsed (i.e.,
45◦ with 315◦, 90◦ with 270◦, and 135◦ with 225◦). For mental
rotation tasks the slope of the linear function is interpreted as
reﬂecting the average rate of change associated with rotating
an object an additional degree (e.g. from 29◦ to 30◦) and the
intercept reﬂects contributions of non-rotational (e.g. preparatory
or decisional) processes [39]. The slope of the egocentric trans-
formation was nearly ﬂat [y=11.63x+1120.30, R2 =0.04] while
for the object-based transformation it was notably more steep
[y=128.92x+760.42, R2 =0.87]. The intercept appears markedly
higher in the egocentric group. However, although there was a
tendency for response times to stimuli presented at 0◦ to differ
between transformations it did not reach Bonferroni corrected
signiﬁcance [F(1,16) =4.03, p=0.062] and all other orientations did
not statistically differ (all p>0.370).
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lig. 3. Mental transformation effect.Mean response times (left panel) and accuracy
bject-based) and stimuli orientation. Error bars depicts the standard error of the m
The stimulus laterality by orientation interaction was also sig-
iﬁcant [F(7,112) =4.09,p<0.000with e˜ = 0.89,p2 =0.20], showing
he typical proﬁle of response times for mental rotation of both
left” and “right” stimuli. Three simple main effects were signif-
cant with Bonferroni correction (p≤0.005). Response time for
left” stimuli varied with orientation [F(7,119) =14.48, p<0.000
ith ê =0.31 2 =0.46], as did response time for “right” stim-
li [F(7,119) =9.92, p<0.000 with ê=0.29, 2 =0.37]. In addition,
esponse time for stimuli rotated at 180◦ [F(1,17) =12.17, p=0.003,
2 = 0.42] were signiﬁcantly slower for left (1431ms) than for right
1339ms) stimuli. Very nearly signiﬁcant at the corrected alpha
evel, stimuli rotated to 45◦ [F(1,17) =9.98, p=0.006, 2 =0.37]
nd 135◦ [F(1,17) =9.63, p=0.006, 2 =0.36] also induced slower
esponses for left (45◦, 1059ms; 135◦, 1201ms) compared to
ight (987ms; 1137ms) stimuli. And while stimuli presented at
◦ [F(1,17) =4.69, p=0.045, 2 =0.22] and at 90◦ [F(1,17) =7.97,
= 0.012, 2 =0.32] clearly suggested a tendency toward signiﬁ-
ance (left: 0◦, 1114ms;90◦, 1090ms; right:1056ms;1037ms), the
emaining orientations depicting counter-clockwise or lateral rota-
ions (225◦, 270◦ and 315◦) did not show any left-right difference
all p≥0.403).
.3. Response accuracy
Response accuracy approached ceiling.Data arebrokendownby
actor in Table 3 (supplementary materials). The ANOVA showed
signiﬁcant main effect of stimulus orientation [F(7,112) =4.85,
< 0.000with e˜ = 0.77,p2 =0.23] and three signiﬁcant interactions.
ollow-up analyses of the three-way interaction of transfor-
ation by head constraint by stimulus laterality [F(1,16) =5.62,
= 0.031,p2 =0.26]werenon-signiﬁcant andwill notbedescribed.
he stimulus orientation effect was accounted for by the low-
st accuracy at 180◦ (90%) compared to all other orientations.
he main effect of head constraint did not reach signiﬁcance
F(1,16) =1.7, p=0.21]. The interaction of transformation with ori-
ntation [F(7,112) =2.11, p=0.049, p2 =0.12] is illustrated in Fig. 3
right panel). The simple main effect of the object-based transfor-
ation was approximately signiﬁcant at the Bonferroni corrected
evel (0.005) after a violation of sphericity was accounted for
F(7,56) =4.336, p=0.006 with e˜ = 0.58, 2 =0.35]. As was found
ith response time, the simple main effect of the egocentric trans-
ormation failed to reach corrected signiﬁcance [p=0.027 with
˜ =1.0]. There was a tendency toward a signiﬁcant difference
etween transformations at 0◦ (p=0.019) and 270◦ (p=0.066),
hile all remainingorientations indicatednodifference in response
ccuracy for the two transformations (all p≥0.194).
A second two-way interaction was found between stimulus
aterality and orientation [F(7,112) =2.88; p=0.008 with e˜ = 1.00,panel) for the interaction effect between type ofmental transformation (egocentric,
p2 =0.15]. Two simple main effects were signiﬁcant at the Bonfer-
roni corrected level (0.005). Response accuracy for “left” stimuli
varied with orientation [F(7,119) =5.05, p<0.003 with ê=0.45,
2 =0.23]; by contrast, accuracy for “right” stimuli failed to reach
corrected signiﬁcance (p=0.024with e˜ = 0.90). Accuracy for left and
right stimuli at most orientations varied by only 1–2%. However,
stimuli at 90◦ did vary [F(1,17) =11.85, p<0.003, 2 =0.41] with
accuracy higher for right side stimuli (96%) than left (92%), and
there was a tendency at 180◦ for right side stimuli (92%) to be more
accurate than left (88%) [F(1,17) =4.18, p=0.057, 2 =0.20].
4. Discussion
This study showed that response proﬁles for mental rotation
of faces and faces-like stimuli were strongly inﬂuenced by the
type of spatial transformation used, but not by the type of stim-
uli processed. Speciﬁcally, regardless of whether the stimulus was
a human face, a non-human (owl) face, or a non-corporeal object
(car), response times and accuracy of participantswho used object-
based transformations were mediated by the degree of angular
rotation, an effect notably absent in participants who used ego-
centric transformations.
Determining what has occurred in mental imagery studies is, at
times, difﬁcult given that imagery is a covert mental process and
that different researchers may use different labels for similar pro-
cesses. We have attempted to deal with the ﬁrst issue through the
use of the semi-structured questionnaire to elicit feedback about
the strategy used. To deal with the second issue, we have adopted
the operational deﬁnitions described in the comprehensive review
of Zacks and Michelon [47]. Hence, we use “egocentric transforma-
tion” to mean the localization of an object to one’s own frame of
reference, and “object-based transformation” to refer to the local-
izationof anobject relative to a complexof axes relative to the same
object.
In the present study, the analysis of the questionnaires admin-
istered after each block indicated that object-based imagers
described the rotation on the vertical plane for all stimuli orien-
tations, while egocentric imagers described several mental spatial
transformations of themselves. This indicates that one set of
instructions spontaneously lead to two entirely different strate-
gies, andhighlights the importance of recognizing the often glossed
over role of individual differences in cognitive strategy and motor
imagery performance [47]. Notably, and in accord to other studies
which included the spatial transformation of one self with respect
to a model room [34] or the spatial transformation of a car and of
one’s own perspective [45], the typical psychophysical proﬁle for
response times (mental rotation function)was found for the object-
based group, but not the egocentric group. This adds support to
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he idea of different cognitive strategies underlying the two men-
al transformations [36,40,46]. It might be argued that even in the
ase of an egocentric mental spatial transformation there could be
neffect of the stimuli’s orientation.However, the lackof such stim-
li’s orientation effect in the egocentric group can be interpreted as
vidence of greater ﬂexibility from physical laws [46]. In particular
t has been shown that RTs for imagined egocentric transforma-
ions can be less dependent on the angle of rotation with respect
o object-based mental transformations [8,9,44,45]. Neurophysio-
ogically, egocentric imagery seems to cause a direct mapping into
ne’sownbodyschemaand involvesoverallmotorprocesses,while
bject-based imagery relies less on motor processes [36,28]. Galati
t al. [20], for example, demonstrated that in a visuospatial judge-
ent task (line bisection) both strategies activate a fronto-parietal
ircuit, but that the object-based (labelled “allocentric” in the
aper) strategy differed in that it had smaller activations through-
ut the circuit andadditionally recruited subcortical regions related
o spatial memory (hippocampal and parahippocampal). Similar
ndings have been reported with virtual reality navigation tasks
27], where the object-based (“allocentric”) strategy additionally
ecruited the thalamus and cerebellum. Moreover, an object-based
trategy is not completely independent from posture variations,
uggesting that smaller motor activations are always needed to
perate with body parts mental images [40].
Constraining head movement did not inﬂuence performance
uring the mental rotation of human faces. This result is the oppo-
ite of what is found for the mental rotation of other body parts,
articularly hands. People tend to use egocentric transformations
hen hands are mentally rotated [7,30,38], recruiting motor pro-
esses and structures in the process [11]. Subjects imagine moving
heir own hands from their actual posture into that of the stimulus
or comparison [31], and thus the position of subject’s own hands
lays an important role in the ability to mentally manipulate hands
n space [11,33,40]. Indeed, the effect of postural constraints is body
art speciﬁc in that placing one’s hands behind the back impairs
he mental rotation of hands but not of feet [25]. Somewhat sur-
risingly, our results indicate that the physical constraint of head
ovement is amanipulationwhichdoesnot inﬂuenceperformance
uring the mental rotation of faces. Previous work from our lab
n cervical dystonia [18] provides some possible insights into this
nding; for the healthy subjects included as a control group, the
esponse times (combined left and right) for mental rotation of
aces, hands, feet and cars showed that the slopes and intercepts
or cars and faces were very similar and lower than for hands and
eet. This suggests that mental rotation of body parts (i.e., hands
nd feet) and mental rotation of faces and faces-like stimuli are
ased, at least in part, on different processes. Moreover, Fiorio et al.
18] reported that patients with idiopathic cervical dystonia have
body-speciﬁc deﬁcit in mental rotation in that all body parts are
ffected (head, hands, and feet). In contrast, patients with focal-
and dystonia are impaired in the mental rotation of only hands
ut not feet, manifesting a representational deﬁcit speciﬁc to the
ody part affected by the disease [17]. Hence, the lack of an effect of
ead constraint on mental rotation may be because the manipula-
ion was applied to the vestibular and neck proprioceptive system
hich, as seen in cervical dystonia patients, is relatively robust to
nterference.
Another ﬁnding was that all three kinds of stimuli were pro-
essed in the same way. The face processing literature may be
f help in understanding this counter-intuitive result. In particu-
ar, the face inversion effect indicates disproportionate disruption
f faces recognition following their upside-down inversion, with
espect to the recognition of other objects [4]. Interestingly it is
lso possible to “spread” the face inversion effect also to other non-
ace stimuli [10,14]. Indeed non-face objects as well as bodies [35]
an be processed as faces [14,42]. It is worth noting that not onlysearch 207 (2010) 452–457
the animal face but also the front of the car used in the present
study bears a structural resemblance with face stimuli.
The typical mental rotation function, that is the psychophysi-
cal proﬁle showing the increase of response times as a function of
the stimulus rotation, was preserved for both left and right stim-
uli. However comparing the performances for left and right stimuli
rotated of the same degree, the stimuli which presented the black
patch on the right side were identiﬁed in most of the cases faster
than the stimuli that had the patch on the left side. It is impor-
tant to note that most studies on mental rotation, including the
present one, recruited only right-handed subjects and found faster
responses for right stimuli with respect to left ones both in healthy
participants [19,22,25,30], and clinical patients [3,29]. The right-
handers’ preference for right stimuli is also consistentwith a recent
study that systematically investigated thepreference for the “right”
stimuli, demonstrating that the effect of laterality is preserved for
right-handers (all subjects in the current study were right-handed)
but not left-handers [26]. This might be explained by psychophys-
ical evidence that left- and right-handed people have different
representation of their own dominant hand [22], and that several
factors, such as proprioception, handedness and visual familiarity,
can orchestrate together in mental rotation [26]. In this way, we
propose that faster andbetter responses for “right” stimuli recorded
in the present study, is due to subject’s hand dominance which is
mirrored in their performance in mental rotation.
5. Concluding remarks
Subject’s descriptions of cognitive strategy highlight that inter-
individual differences can lead to the spontaneous use of different
imagery transformations in the presence of one set of instructions.
This idea is in line with evidence that a mental strategy usually
used for body parts can be used to mentally spatially transform
an object [28]. Moreover, given that within each strategy all three
types of face or face-like stimuli appear to have been processed in
the same way, regardless of the possibility to move the head, we
propose the data points to the dominance of the high-level process
(mental transformation strategy) over the low-level one (elabora-
tion of the stimulus), following a top-down pathway. This notion is
in keeping with evidence that it is possible to voluntary adopt an
egocentric (internal) or object-based (external)mental transforma-
tion to perform the same imagery task, resulting in the activation of
two different but partially overlapping brain networks [28,36] and
supporting the dissociation between egocentric and object-based
reference frame [18].
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2009.10.037.
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